Boycotting the boycotters
By Sean Gannon
The Ireland-Palestine Solidarity Campaign's (IPSC) recent success in persuading Ireland's official arts association, Aosd'na, to pass a resolution urging Irish artists to "reflect deeply" before engaging in any cooperation with state-sponsored Israeli cultural events and institutions is, without doubt, a regrettable development. Aosd'na is Ireland's most prestigious cultural body and its decision to issue what the IPSC chairman described in Haaretz (April 13) as "a boycott call in all but name" will carry weight in the Irish arts world. In fact, this is not the first time that the IPSC has successfully targeted Israeli culture. Last summer it launched campaigns against Israeli government sponsorship for a series of Dublin-based events, which it argued would "align the Irish cultural sector with the oppression and racism" of an "ethnocratic rogue state." While official funding remained in place for events featuring poet Amir Or and A.B. Yehoshua, despite vociferous IPSC protests, sponsorship for both a screening of Eytan Fox's "Walk on Water" and a performance by the Toy Vivo Duo was canceled by the organizers. However, the media coverage of these IPSC successes risks investing them with a significance they scarcely deserve. For in reality, the great majority of its boycott campaigns have resoundingly failed. For instance, its ongoing efforts to persuade Irish companies such as CRH to divest from Israel and its "National Boycott Days" of Israeli produce have failed to make any impression; Irish-Israeli trade has increased exponentially in recent years and is now worth about $700 million a year. The IPSC's attempt to orchestrate boycotts of the Ireland-Israel World Cup qualifying games in 2005 proved another toe-curling shambles: 3,000 Irish fans traveled to Ramat Gan to watch Ireland's away game, while 34,000 attended the rematch in Dublin. And last September's well-publicized academic boycott campaign quickly crashed and burned after being denounced by both the Irish government and the European Commission.
The IPSC's general lack of success may appear unusual in a country where the great majority energetically sympathizes with the Palestinians, perceiving them as a dispossessed nation, denied their right to self-determination by Zionism's neocolonial adventure. Consequently, there has been overwhelming public support for Dublin's staunchly pro-Palestinian positions on issues from the legitimacy of Yasser Arafat to the illegality of the security fence, while its trenchant attacks on Israel's use of "reckless and disproportionate force" in Lebanon last summer were also widely applauded. Yet the IPSC remains a marginal force where one might almost expect to find a mass movement. Why? Because the Irish mainstream is deterred by the IPSC's extremist approach to the issues. Its recent dismissal of Meretz-Yahad as a "phony" peace party "eager to preserve a mildly adjusted version of the status quo" has raised questions about the shape of the settlement the IPSC itself advocates, while its perceived ambivalence on Palestinian terrorism is another problematical factor. Suicide bombings have been condemned, but other attacks have been categorized as "lawful resistance" or "forceful defense," while the characterization as terrorists of the killers of 13 Israeli reservists in Jenin in April 2002 was described as "robbing the word 'terrorist' of all meaning" (unsurprising, perhaps, given that the IPSC's Belfast branch was until recently chaired by a convicted IRA bomber). The Irish mainstream has been further alienated by the stridency of the IPSC's anti-Israel rhetoric, which often verges on demonization. While the still-commonplace equation of Zionism and Nazism is now being discouraged, the drawing of analogies between Israel and apartheid-era South Africa is present IPSC policy and its chairman is currently promoting the Hebrew term hafrada (separation) as an Israel-specific alternative to the original Afrikaans term. Meanwhile, the IPSC's most prominent national spokesman implicitly compared "people who genuinely support Israel" with "people who genuinely support pedophilia" in a recent online debate on the Aosd?na issue. The IPSC's tendency, despite its frequent denunciations of anti-Semitism, to inadvertently stray close to the line has been an additional cause of disquiet. For instance, while it deplored the post-Qana pinning of children's shoes to an Irish synagogue gate, it previously accused Israel of "implementing barbaric racist policies in the name of Judaism," and its official charity Christmas cards have, by juxtaposing images of Israel's security detail with traditional nativity iconography, evoked religious anti-Semitic themes. An IPSC Web site's campaign to expose the "Zionist propaganda machine" by effectively highlighting the Jewishness of writers and journalists also caused controversy; Gil Troy, writing in The Forward, described it as "the internet version of the Nazi yellow star." And just last month, prominent IPSC members themselves began quarrelling over the extent of anti-Semitism in the organization with one internationally renowned activist arguing that they could "no longer claim naivete" on the issue, given that their current Israeli Blood Diamond campaign "uses a Jewish stereotype [i.e. 'diamond-dealing Jews'] to promote its agenda." While Irish anti-Israel agitation remains in the hands of such extremists, the Aosdna resolution will prove the exception rather than the rule. Sean Gannon is a freelance writer and researcher on Irish-Israeli issues and is chairman of the Irish Friends of Israel. He is currently writing a book on relations between the two countries.
Thursday, April 26, 2007
Friday, March 2, 2007
Redefining the right-left divide (Haaretz)
From Haaretz (2 March 2007):
How can one criticize MK Esterina Tartman, who was hoping to be appointed minister of tourism, for her extremist views? After all, Avigdor Lieberman, the leader of her party Yisrael Beitenu and the minister for strategic threats, is already notorious for questioning the loyalty and determining conditions for citizenship of the non-Jewish citizens of Israel.
Yet Tartman - even without considering her involvement in recent scandals - succeeds in raising the bar of radicalism even higher. Her remarks concerning now-minister Raleb Majadele (Labor), to the effect that appointing an Arab minister amounts to "assimilation" and is a "lethal blow to Zionism," made even Lieberman look like a symbol of political correctness.
Lieberman and Tartman cultivate a purist ideology, which encourages making Israel as ethnically Jewish as possible, not as large as possible, and increasing the percentage of Jews among the overall Israeli population, even if this results in loss of territory. Unlike the "traditional" extreme right-wing parties in Israel, most notably the National Union, that attempt to push the border as far to the east of the Green Line as possible, Yisrael Beitenu in some cases promotes instead the drawing of the borderline west of the '67 border as part of its effort to denaturalize Arab Israelis. While Yisrael Beitenu's hawkish sentiments make it still reject territorial compromises with the Palestinians, this opposition is not its raison d'etre, as it recognizes, if only half-heartedly, what most Israelis have already acknowledged: that a two-state solution is essential for maintaining a Jewish majority in a democratic Jewish state. Moreover, the focus on demographic purity rather than land size enables Yisrael Beitenu to collaborate effectively in a government that does not disapprove peace negotiations, yet is not actively seeking them.
The ideology of Yisrael Beitenu is not innovative and its electoral success is hardly surprising; rather these elements correspond well with the emergence of xenophobic right-wing parties that have gained public support and visibility in almost every European country, and which regard ethnic minorities as threats to the dominant majority. This actually indicates how normal Israel has become: We too have our own European-like extreme right-wing party. But if Israel loses its claim to moral superiority, it loses its claim to protest when extremists gain victory in other countries.
Should Jean-Marie Le Pen make it again in April to the second round of the presidential election in France, Israeli leaders will face difficulties in expressing their concern over the rise of the xenophobic right in Europe. If right-wing extremists are called to form coalitions in a European country, how can Israel summon its ambassador to Jerusalem in protest, as it did when J?rg Haider's Freedom Party joined the coalition in Austria in 2000?
The rise of a European-like extreme right-wing in Israel becomes a political burden for Jewish leaders in America and Europe, too. It might even compromise their ability to represent Jewish interests. What will David Harris, the executive director of the American Jewish Committee, do when the new tourism minister makes her first official visit to America to promote Israeli tourist interests? If he and his colleagues meet with her, how can they decline meeting any senior right-wing extremists from Europe?
Israel is yet to develop European-like consensus politics to confront the rise of our extremists. In the French example, when Jean-Marie Le Pen made it to the second round in 2002, the left in France stood by the rightist candidate Jacque Chirac to prove that besides the legitimate right-wing, there is extremism whose claim to power should not be tolerated. Nobody waited for Le Pen to show whether his political platform was mere lip service to charm his electorate or whether he was serious in executing it. His views were enough to push him out of the consensus.
In recent years the concept of Greater Israel has lost its appeal, since almost all key political players now accept the principle of a two-state solution and the necessity of establishing a Palestinian state. Consequently, the traditional left-right divide in Israel has considerably blurred, and Kadima emerged as a strange mixture of former politicians from the Labor and the Likud parties.
With the new right in Israel now after the Purest Israel rather than the Greater Israel, we need to make a new distinction between the country's left and right: a left that encourages the integration of the non-Jewish population in the life of Israel, with its Jewish majority; and a right that looks for ways to limit non-Jewish participation in society and politics. Moreover, Yisrael Beitenu makes it clear that the importance of the leftist Zionist parties may lie in convincing the public that Zionist and Jewish values exclude purity and racism, and favor a political integration of the country's minorities.
Yoav Sivan is the LGBT coordinator of Young Meretz and the International Union of Socialist Youth (www.yoavsivan.org).
How can one criticize MK Esterina Tartman, who was hoping to be appointed minister of tourism, for her extremist views? After all, Avigdor Lieberman, the leader of her party Yisrael Beitenu and the minister for strategic threats, is already notorious for questioning the loyalty and determining conditions for citizenship of the non-Jewish citizens of Israel.
Yet Tartman - even without considering her involvement in recent scandals - succeeds in raising the bar of radicalism even higher. Her remarks concerning now-minister Raleb Majadele (Labor), to the effect that appointing an Arab minister amounts to "assimilation" and is a "lethal blow to Zionism," made even Lieberman look like a symbol of political correctness.
Lieberman and Tartman cultivate a purist ideology, which encourages making Israel as ethnically Jewish as possible, not as large as possible, and increasing the percentage of Jews among the overall Israeli population, even if this results in loss of territory. Unlike the "traditional" extreme right-wing parties in Israel, most notably the National Union, that attempt to push the border as far to the east of the Green Line as possible, Yisrael Beitenu in some cases promotes instead the drawing of the borderline west of the '67 border as part of its effort to denaturalize Arab Israelis. While Yisrael Beitenu's hawkish sentiments make it still reject territorial compromises with the Palestinians, this opposition is not its raison d'etre, as it recognizes, if only half-heartedly, what most Israelis have already acknowledged: that a two-state solution is essential for maintaining a Jewish majority in a democratic Jewish state. Moreover, the focus on demographic purity rather than land size enables Yisrael Beitenu to collaborate effectively in a government that does not disapprove peace negotiations, yet is not actively seeking them.
The ideology of Yisrael Beitenu is not innovative and its electoral success is hardly surprising; rather these elements correspond well with the emergence of xenophobic right-wing parties that have gained public support and visibility in almost every European country, and which regard ethnic minorities as threats to the dominant majority. This actually indicates how normal Israel has become: We too have our own European-like extreme right-wing party. But if Israel loses its claim to moral superiority, it loses its claim to protest when extremists gain victory in other countries.
Should Jean-Marie Le Pen make it again in April to the second round of the presidential election in France, Israeli leaders will face difficulties in expressing their concern over the rise of the xenophobic right in Europe. If right-wing extremists are called to form coalitions in a European country, how can Israel summon its ambassador to Jerusalem in protest, as it did when J?rg Haider's Freedom Party joined the coalition in Austria in 2000?
The rise of a European-like extreme right-wing in Israel becomes a political burden for Jewish leaders in America and Europe, too. It might even compromise their ability to represent Jewish interests. What will David Harris, the executive director of the American Jewish Committee, do when the new tourism minister makes her first official visit to America to promote Israeli tourist interests? If he and his colleagues meet with her, how can they decline meeting any senior right-wing extremists from Europe?
Israel is yet to develop European-like consensus politics to confront the rise of our extremists. In the French example, when Jean-Marie Le Pen made it to the second round in 2002, the left in France stood by the rightist candidate Jacque Chirac to prove that besides the legitimate right-wing, there is extremism whose claim to power should not be tolerated. Nobody waited for Le Pen to show whether his political platform was mere lip service to charm his electorate or whether he was serious in executing it. His views were enough to push him out of the consensus.
In recent years the concept of Greater Israel has lost its appeal, since almost all key political players now accept the principle of a two-state solution and the necessity of establishing a Palestinian state. Consequently, the traditional left-right divide in Israel has considerably blurred, and Kadima emerged as a strange mixture of former politicians from the Labor and the Likud parties.
With the new right in Israel now after the Purest Israel rather than the Greater Israel, we need to make a new distinction between the country's left and right: a left that encourages the integration of the non-Jewish population in the life of Israel, with its Jewish majority; and a right that looks for ways to limit non-Jewish participation in society and politics. Moreover, Yisrael Beitenu makes it clear that the importance of the leftist Zionist parties may lie in convincing the public that Zionist and Jewish values exclude purity and racism, and favor a political integration of the country's minorities.
Yoav Sivan is the LGBT coordinator of Young Meretz and the International Union of Socialist Youth (www.yoavsivan.org).
Thursday, March 1, 2007
יד אחת
מ"ישראלי" (1 במרץ 2007):
את המיתוס של "טוב למות בעד ארצנו" כבר הרגו מספיק פעמים. כל שנה לקראת י"א באדר, יום הקרב בתל-חי, חוקרים מדופלמים ועיתונאים נחשבים טוענים מחדש שיוסף טרומפלדור לפני מותו כנראה לא התפנה למלאכת הקודש של קופי-רייטינג והסתפק במקום באיזו קללה ברוסית. אבל זה באמת לא משנה. אמר או לא אמר, על הססמה הזאת, שמהווה סמל כבר כמעט מאה, התחנכו דורות של ישראלים.
שתי בעיות עם המוטו הזה. האחת היא ברישא "טוב למות". זה אולי ערך ציוני, אבל לא ממש ערך יהודי. הקרבה עבור המולדת ובכלל עבור הזולת עד כדי סיכון החיים עלולה לצערנו להיות הכרח, ובמציאות החיים בישראל פרקטיקה של ממש, אבל מכאן ועד לספר בשבחי המוות המרחק עוד גדול. להבדיל, הרי תמיד אנו מזדעזעים מצילומי ווידאו של טרוריסטים שלפני פיגוע ההתאבדות מספרים את הגרסה שלהם ל"טוב למות". הזעזוע שלנו הוא לא רק מפני האופן הנורא בו הם בוחרים למות ולהמית, אלא גם מפני שהם ששים אליי מוות.
שתי בעיות עם המוטו הזה. האחת היא ברישא "טוב למות". זה אולי ערך ציוני, אבל לא ממש ערך יהודי. הקרבה עבור המולדת ובכלל עבור הזולת עד כדי סיכון החיים עלולה לצערנו להיות הכרח, ובמציאות החיים בישראל פרקטיקה של ממש, אבל מכאן ועד לספר בשבחי המוות המרחק עוד גדול. להבדיל, הרי תמיד אנו מזדעזעים מצילומי ווידאו של טרוריסטים שלפני פיגוע ההתאבדות מספרים את הגרסה שלהם ל"טוב למות". הזעזוע שלנו הוא לא רק מפני האופן הנורא בו הם בוחרים למות ולהמית, אלא גם מפני שהם ששים אליי מוות.
אבל יכול להיות שאני סתם קטנוני ולא מצליח לקלוט את ההומור הטרומפלדורי הדק. הרי השאלה הגדולה באמת היא דווקא לגבי הסיפא: מה צריך לעשות היום "בעד ארצנו". התשובות כבר לא כל כך פשוטות היום ויתכן שההארה של הגיבור מתל-חי לא תופסת. לא שחלילה המולדת אינה יקרה בעיניי, שלא כדאי להקריב עבורה. נהפוך הוא. דווקא מכוון שישראל כה חשובה לי אני תוהה מה טרומפלדור היה עושה היום בעד ארצנו ומה הוא היה מקריב למענה. אם הוא היה חבר כנסת, יכול להיות שהיה מוכן אפילו להקריב את אמינותו האישית ואת יושרו הציבורי למען הציבור. ואולי היה אפילו מוכן לשקר לגבי תאריו האקדמיים כדי לקדם את הטוב הכללי.
ובכלל, אולי "טוב למות בעד ארצנו" אבל בינינו, טרומפלדור לא באמת אמר מי צריך למות.
יואב סיון
Wednesday, February 21, 2007
פארק השרון
מ"ישראלי" (21 בפברואר 2007):
אתמול נתבשרנו כי מזכיר הממשלה והשר להגנת הסביבה פנו לחברת פארק איילון בבקשה לקרוא את הפארק המיועד לקום במרכז גוש דן על שמו של ראש הממשלה לשעבר, אריאל שרון, השוכב מונשם מרחק קילומטרים ספורים משם בבית החולים שיבא. כמובן, כולם מיהרו לתמוך ברעיון. המשפחה הביעה את תמיכתה ואף נודע שראש הממשלה מסייע ברקע. אפשר להאמין שאף שעוד יש אוויר בריאותיו של ראש הממשלה לשעבר, גוש דן יזכה בקרוב לריאה ירוקה על שמו של המונשם המפורסם ביותר בארץ.
הנימוקים התומכים באקט ההנצחה מציינים את אהבתו של שרון לאדמת הארץ. עבודת האדמה היא אחד משני התלמים בהם שרון הלך כל חייו (השני, למתעניינים, הוא בטחון ישראל), ציינו הפונים.
מצער שהשר להגנת הסביבה, גדעון עזרא, שוכח שאם אריאל שרון מזוהה עם איכות הסביבה בישראל הרי זה לא לחיוב. במגוון התפקידים ששרון שימש בהם כשר התשתיות, הבינוי והשיכון ובעוד כמה משרדים הוא דווקא הלביש את ישראל שלמת בטון ומלט ולא דאג לכסותה הטבעית. אף כשר חקלאות הוא דאג לאינטרסים הצרים של החקלאים על חשבון משאבי המים והקרקע של ארץ חמדת. אך בעיקר שרון פגע באיכות הסביבה בשטחים (ולמען ההגינות, גם בכמה מדינות שכנות). ההתנחלויות שאריאל שרון הוא מהאחראים העיקריים להקמתן הן דוגמה ומופת לא רק לחוסר תבונה מדינית ולערכים מוסרים קלוקלים אלא גם לטעם אסתטי גרוע במיוחד: בתים עטורים בגגות רעפים שמתאימים אולי לנוף אירופי אך בוודאי לא להרי השומרון וכבישים שמגלחים את ההרים.
אף אם אין זה הולם לקרוא לפנינה של איכות הסביבה על שם שרון (וכידוע, השם פארק השרון כבר תפוס), אז חובה עלינו, מוקירי זכרו ומכבדי פועלו למצוא דרכים ראויות אחרות להנציח את האיש. אני מציע לקרוא למלחמת לבנון (הראשונה) "מלחמת שרון" והמהדרין אף יקראו למלחמת לבנון השניה "מלחמת שרון השניה", אם כי אפשר להמתין עד שוועדת החקירה תכריז על תרומתו של שרון לחוסר המוכנות של צה"ל. את תרומתו הירוקה של שרון אפשר להנציח בכך שנכריז על הקו הירוק כ"קו שרון" שכן שלא היה איש שתרם בעשורים האחרונים יותר ממנו למחיקתו ולהרחקת הסכם שלום בין ישראל לשכניה.
אבל אולי כדאי בכל זאת להסתפק בפארק השרון. שרון בוודאי היה מתגלגל מצחוק מהרעיון, וכך לפחות ננציח לדורות הבאים את חוש ההומור המשובח שלו.
Monday, January 29, 2007
הוא קוסם!
מ"ישראלי" (29 בינואר 2007):
מעולם לא הבנתי את ההגיון האורי-גלרי בכיפוף כפיות. יש מספיק דברים שבורים בעולם שצריך לתקן אז למה לקחת כפיות שלא חטאו ולא עשו רע לאיש מימיהן ולהפוך אותן לנכות. אבל אני כנראה במיעוט, כפי שתעיד ההצלחה של טקס הכתרת יורש העצר לשושלת גלר המפוארת.
למזלנו, הדמוקרטיה הישראלית מאפשרת לכל אחד לנסות להתמודד על התואר הנחשק של קוסם העל, ונותנת לכל מי שמכשיר טלפון נייד בכיסו הזדמנות להשפיע על דור העתיד של הקוסמות הישראלית. אפילו מקימים אופרציה מרשימה כדי לבחור במכופף הכפיות הבא, הכוללת צוות שופטים ישראלי ובינלאומי, מוקדי שידור בכל העולם (אפילו באסטוניה מתעניינים בקוסמות העברית), וכמובן הודעות ה- SMSשל כל בית ישראל. אבל מופע האיתנים של בחירת היורש האולטימטיבי לאורי גלר נועד בסופו של דבר להעביר את המסר שאף אם בתי הקברות מלאים באנשים שאין להם תחליף, יורש אמיתי לגדול מכופפי הכפיות מאז המצאת הסכו"ם לא יהיה. הולך ופוחת הדור, מכופף כפיות בסדר גודל של גלר לא יקום עוד.
כשברך את המשתתפים אמר להם האורי-גלר "לשלושתכם יש משהו מאורי גלר": האחד ניחן במנהיגות, השני במיסטיקה, השלישי בכריזמה. למרבה הצער לאיש מהם אין המרכיב הסודי, הכוחות על טבעיים, שאורי גלר טוען שניחן בהם. ההכרזה הזאת היתה עילה מוצדקת עבור אגודת הקוסמים הישראלית לכנס את חבריה ולהתנער מהתוכנית.
בלי לגרוע מחשיבות השואו של גלר, מופע אחיזת העיניים המרכזי של השבוע החולף היה דווקא בירושלים במשכן הנשיא. במשך ארבעים דקות בשידור ישיר בטלוויזיה ניסה משה קצב לעשות את הבלתי-אפשרי ולשכנע את כל העולם בחפותו. הרייטינג היה מצוין, האמביציה מרשימה. אם הוא היה מצליח הוא היה יכול להיות זכאי לתואר הגלר הבא. כנראה הבעיה היא שנשיא המדינה, להבדיל משלושת הקוסמים הצעירים שעלו לגמר, לא ניחן במנהיגות, במסטיקה או בכריזמה. נותר להמתין ולראות האם לקצב יש כוחות על טבעיים כדי לשקם את מעמדו הציבורי ואת כבוד משרת הנשיא.
אבל כמו שלתכנית הטלוויזיה המצליחה של גלר יהיה המשך בשנה הבאה, שיהיה לא פחות מרשים’ יומרני ורב פעלולים מהמופע הנוכחי, כך ברור כבר עתה מה הולך להיות מופע הקסמים הבא סביב מוסד הנשיאות. רב קסם שמעון פרס מכין את שואו המאה. הוא יוצא במופע מרהיב כדי לעשות את את מה שאיש לא מאמין שבגדר האפשר - לנצח בבחירות לנשיאות.
Monday, January 15, 2007
Let's not play the 'no talk' game
With Limor Ben-Har
From the Jerusalem Post (15 Januar 2007)
Surprisingly, Syria still occupies the front pages of Israeli newspapers: Talking to Syria, not talking to Syria, making gestures or playing hardball. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert finally articulated a sentence that included he was "willing to talk if…" instead of "never, because...."
Yet the preconditions Olmert has set easily give the impression that he is not too keen on a breakthrough with Syria.
The preconditions seem reasonable enough. Syria is home to Khaled Mashal and a channel for Iranian influence in the region. The catch is that insisting on obvious Israeli goals as conditions to even start talking will ensure we end up with no process and no achievements.
Syrian President Bashar Assad has publicly been calling for peace talks with Israel with no preconditions. This shows that when Arab leaders' unconditional readiness to negotiate comes true, Israeli leaders find themselves helpless.
Israeli policymakers don't like it that Assad expects the Golan Heights as an outcome to negotiations, but Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni says she wants "to know exactly what we are going to get in the end."
Contrary to what we have been led to believe, negotiations are not the end-goal but the process leading to the big moment - the behind-the-scenes work that eventually enables that desired photo-op. And in emotionally-laden conflicts like ours it is impossible to agree on a final draft before actually negotiating it; and it is a mistake to demand to know the closing details from the outset. That is why agreements like the Geneva Accords are unique - they leave no place for circumstantial compromises.
There is, of course, a point in envisioning the endgame, and building a strategy that would get us there. Yet we should allow room for compromise, flexibility and creativity until we reach our goals. And even the goals themselves may change with time. It's unrealistic to know the exact endgame before even starting it.
CONSIDER, for example, Assad's political calculations. Even if he is frank about his peace wishes - and it's hardly self-evident he is - he will not reveal all his cards in the first round. We need a process to discover his intentions. More dramatically, even if Assad enters the game with ulterior motives, the process's political dynamics might put him on a track he did not plan.
How can the peace negotiations proceed? Imagine Israel and Syria agreeing to negotiate without preconditions. The Americans and Europeans vouch for an agreement and pour the economic wherewithal into it. Then the parties go into negotiations, presenting their demands. And then the process can advance in different paths leading to different consequences.
Hypothetical example: A smart mediator might be able to broker a deal in which Israel is willing to give back only part of the land in return for Syria blocking Iran without reaching full peace with Israel, while Syrian motivation is based on a promised improvement in the relations with the United States.
PLAUSIBLE or not, this is only one idea. Many combinations can come up once negotiations actually take place. But for negotiations to stand a chance, they need to be conducted out of the spotlight by negotiators empowered for give and take. Otherwise each side will leak to the press each time the other party agrees to back down, and the fear alone of public opinion will hinder any substantial concession.
We don't want a repeat of the Camp David 2000 scenario, where top politicians and officials met, supposedly behind close doors, while outside those doors the press was ambushing them for pieces of information.
That peace talks with Syria remain on the top of Israel's agenda, hints that prospects for a political initiative are not over yet. Americans and Europeans are not likely to apply pressure on Jerusalem to talk to Syria, so such pressure must come from people like Defense Minister Amir Peretz. It would actually help save his political neck.
Peretz's main problem - or, more accurately, ours - is that his attempts seem directed at the Israeli newspapers rather than at the leaders with whom negotiations should take place.
Agreeing to negotiate is not in itself a compromise, but merely sticking to Israel's traditional position that we are always willing to talk. Let the other party play hard to get. The real negotiations should take place bilaterally between Israelis and Syrians, and not among Israelis over Assad's true intentions.
Granted, once negotiations start, it is hard to guarantee their success. The effort put into the talks could lead to unintended consequences. But we have a responsibility to at least make the effort.
Ben-Har is a graduate student at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, the University of Michigan. Sivan is the LGBT Coordinator of Young Meretz and of the International Union of Socialist Youth. His Web site is www.yoavsivan.org.
From the Jerusalem Post (15 Januar 2007)
Surprisingly, Syria still occupies the front pages of Israeli newspapers: Talking to Syria, not talking to Syria, making gestures or playing hardball. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert finally articulated a sentence that included he was "willing to talk if…" instead of "never, because...."
Yet the preconditions Olmert has set easily give the impression that he is not too keen on a breakthrough with Syria.
The preconditions seem reasonable enough. Syria is home to Khaled Mashal and a channel for Iranian influence in the region. The catch is that insisting on obvious Israeli goals as conditions to even start talking will ensure we end up with no process and no achievements.
Syrian President Bashar Assad has publicly been calling for peace talks with Israel with no preconditions. This shows that when Arab leaders' unconditional readiness to negotiate comes true, Israeli leaders find themselves helpless.
Israeli policymakers don't like it that Assad expects the Golan Heights as an outcome to negotiations, but Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni says she wants "to know exactly what we are going to get in the end."
Contrary to what we have been led to believe, negotiations are not the end-goal but the process leading to the big moment - the behind-the-scenes work that eventually enables that desired photo-op. And in emotionally-laden conflicts like ours it is impossible to agree on a final draft before actually negotiating it; and it is a mistake to demand to know the closing details from the outset. That is why agreements like the Geneva Accords are unique - they leave no place for circumstantial compromises.
There is, of course, a point in envisioning the endgame, and building a strategy that would get us there. Yet we should allow room for compromise, flexibility and creativity until we reach our goals. And even the goals themselves may change with time. It's unrealistic to know the exact endgame before even starting it.
CONSIDER, for example, Assad's political calculations. Even if he is frank about his peace wishes - and it's hardly self-evident he is - he will not reveal all his cards in the first round. We need a process to discover his intentions. More dramatically, even if Assad enters the game with ulterior motives, the process's political dynamics might put him on a track he did not plan.
How can the peace negotiations proceed? Imagine Israel and Syria agreeing to negotiate without preconditions. The Americans and Europeans vouch for an agreement and pour the economic wherewithal into it. Then the parties go into negotiations, presenting their demands. And then the process can advance in different paths leading to different consequences.
Hypothetical example: A smart mediator might be able to broker a deal in which Israel is willing to give back only part of the land in return for Syria blocking Iran without reaching full peace with Israel, while Syrian motivation is based on a promised improvement in the relations with the United States.
PLAUSIBLE or not, this is only one idea. Many combinations can come up once negotiations actually take place. But for negotiations to stand a chance, they need to be conducted out of the spotlight by negotiators empowered for give and take. Otherwise each side will leak to the press each time the other party agrees to back down, and the fear alone of public opinion will hinder any substantial concession.
We don't want a repeat of the Camp David 2000 scenario, where top politicians and officials met, supposedly behind close doors, while outside those doors the press was ambushing them for pieces of information.
That peace talks with Syria remain on the top of Israel's agenda, hints that prospects for a political initiative are not over yet. Americans and Europeans are not likely to apply pressure on Jerusalem to talk to Syria, so such pressure must come from people like Defense Minister Amir Peretz. It would actually help save his political neck.
Peretz's main problem - or, more accurately, ours - is that his attempts seem directed at the Israeli newspapers rather than at the leaders with whom negotiations should take place.
Agreeing to negotiate is not in itself a compromise, but merely sticking to Israel's traditional position that we are always willing to talk. Let the other party play hard to get. The real negotiations should take place bilaterally between Israelis and Syrians, and not among Israelis over Assad's true intentions.
Granted, once negotiations start, it is hard to guarantee their success. The effort put into the talks could lead to unintended consequences. But we have a responsibility to at least make the effort.
Ben-Har is a graduate student at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, the University of Michigan. Sivan is the LGBT Coordinator of Young Meretz and of the International Union of Socialist Youth. His Web site is www.yoavsivan.org.
לו הייתי רוטשילד
מ"ישראלי" (15 בינואר 2007)
כל כך קל עבורי לומר במי אני מקנא השבוע. לא כל כך קל בעצם: אני לא יודע את שמו או את פרטיו האישים. כל האינפורמציה שיש לי היא שמושא הערצתי גר בפתח תקווה ושהוא זכה ב- 53 מליון שקל בטוטו. למען הסר ספק, הסיבה לקנאתי היא לא מקום מגוריו באם המושבות כי אם סכום הזכיה הגדול ביותר בתולדות ישראל. 53 מליון שקל. אם אפילו כשממירים את זה לדולרים וליורו זה נשמע הרבה, כנראה שבאמת אפשר להסתדר עם הסכום הזה.
עליי להודות, גם את ההבדל בין לוטו לטוטו אני לא ממש יודע (משהו עם כדורגל?), וכשהייתי בלאס ווגאס לא הימרתי
אף לא בניקל. כנראה שאת ההון האישי שלי אצטרך לבנות לאט לאט בשיטות חלופיות. אבל את המשמעות של המספר 53 מליון אני מבין היטב.
בסכום הזה הייתי יכול לסגור את האוברדרפט בבנק (שלי ושל כל חבריי), לשלם שכר לימוד לאוניברסיטה בשביל לגמור סופסוף את התואר וגם לשדרג את אופניי לדגם משופר. ואם הייתי רוצה להתפרע אוכל לעבור לדירה של ארבעה חדרים במרכז ת"א עם חניה צמודה (לאופניים).
אבל עדיין ישאר כסף לעשות דברים יותר מלהיבים: למשל, להיות ארקדי גדייאמק לרגע ולארגן מסיבות פאר עם ביבי נתניהו, הרי רק ההזמנות מעור התנין יחסלו חלק לא מבוטל מהכסף. או אולי להיות שרי אריסון להרף עין ולקנות בנק במבצע. יש רק בעיה אחת עם הרעיונות האלה: אני עוד עלול להרוויח מהם. מסיבות הראווה החדשות שלי עוד עלולות לסדר לי חסינות בישראל ופנסיה מהכנסת, והבנק שאני מתכנן לקנות, אף על פי שאני סוגר את האוברדרפט שלי מייד, הוא עוד ימשיך להרוויח. ואז במקום להיות תקוע עם 53 מליון שקל, תוך שנתיים יהיו לי, 153 מליון, שאין לי מושג איך לבזבז. ומה אעשה אז? כמה כבר אפשר לשפר את האופניים שלי? או את הדירה?
כסף זה בטח לא דבר רע. לפחות ככה גידלו אותי. אבל בסופו של דבר יש גבול לכמה אפשר להגדיל את המסך של הטלוויזיה ואיכות הפורצלן של השירותים גם היא לא ניתנת לשיפור אינסופי. אמנם לא הייתי מתנגד לקבל 53 מליון שקל, אבל גם הסכום הזה לא יוציא אותי מהמיטה עם השפעת ממנה אני סובל עכשיו.
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